Annex B. Technical and Organisational Measures (Article 32 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679)
Version 1.4, published on 19 November 2026, effective from 19 November 2026.
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| Item | Content |
|---|---|
| Title | Annex B, Technical and Organisational Measures |
| Version | 1.4 |
| Text of this Annex | https://evolus.ai/en/security-measures |
| Annexed to | General Conditions of Use for Evolus and Employee AI ("Conditions"), version 2.1, published at https://evolus.ai/en/terms-of-use, and Annex A, version 1.5, published at https://evolus.ai/en/data-processing-agreement |
| Prepared by | CodeDesign S.r.l., Via Nino Pesce 38, 18018 Taggia (IM), VAT No. IT01739830089 |
| Contact point | privacy@codedesign.it |
Introduction
This Annex describes the technical and organisational measures that CodeDesign S.r.l. (hereinafter the "Provider") adopts pursuant to Article 32 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 in order to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk in the processing of personal data carried out on behalf of the Customer.
The measures are described by function and by effect. The Provider does not set out implementation details, names of internal systems, addresses, components or configuration parameters whose disclosure would reduce the effectiveness of the measures themselves. Further information is made available to the Customer in the manner and within the limits of Article 4.8 of Annex A.
This Annex describes the state of the measures as at the date of the version. It may be updated by the Provider provided that the overall level of security is not reduced, in accordance with Article 12.5 of the Conditions and with section 15 below.
1. Organisation of security
1.1 Roles. The Provider has formally assigned the following responsibilities:
- a) Information security manager: assessment of the security risks, verification of the effectiveness of the measures, proposal and verification of the corrective actions.
- b) Data protection contact person: coordination of data protection matters, qualification and handling of breaches from a legal perspective, keeping of the breach register, relations with the supervisory authority, monitoring of the privacy@codedesign.it mailbox.
- c) Incident management manager: taking charge of the reports, technical containment, collection and preservation of the evidence, reconstruction of the scope of the event, coordination of the restoration.
- d) Management: decision on the notifications to the supervisory authority and on the communications to data subjects when the Provider acts as controller, approval of the resources for the corrective actions.
1.2 Data protection officer. The Provider has not designated a data protection officer pursuant to Article 37 of the Regulation, having assessed that the conditions for it do not apply. The assessment is reviewed at least annually. The contact point remains the privacy@codedesign.it mailbox.
1.3 Management system. The Provider has started the adoption of an information security management system compliant with the ISO/IEC 27001:2022 standard and the related certification process is under way. As at the date of this Annex the certification has not been obtained. The Provider does not declare that it is certified and will inform Customers if it is obtained, updating this Annex.
1.4 Review. The measures described in this Annex are reviewed at least annually, after every personal data breach classified as medium or high risk and after every significant change to the architecture of the Service.
2. Access control and authentication
2.1 Centralised identity. Access to the platform takes place exclusively through a centralised identity management system, separate from the application. Users' credentials are not stored by the application.
2.2 Verification of the email address. The default authorisation policy of all the application interfaces requires, in addition to authentication, that the user's email address be verified. Access is denied in the absence of that requirement.
2.3 Two-factor authentication. A second authentication factor is available by means of a one-time code sent to the user's email address, configurable on the identity system.
2.4 Validation of the sessions. Access tokens are validated in depth: verification of the audience, verification of the issuer against an explicit list, verification of the duration and of the expiry, verification of the signature with rejection of unsigned tokens, limited clock tolerance. Negative outcomes are logged with the reason for the rejection, without the token ever being logged.
2.5 Application access keys. The access keys issued to the Customer for the automated use of the Service are generated with high entropy, are kept at rest exclusively in the form of a cryptographic hash and are shown in clear text only once, at the time of creation. A key without declared scopes does not allow authentication on any channel. Each key may be limited to specific Digital employees. The keys have their status and expiry verified at each use.
2.6 Separation of the privileges of the keys. An application key may under no circumstances obtain platform, system or organisation privileges, and is subject to an explicit list of operations that are always denied, including the management of the subscription, the modification of the credits and the management of the quotas. Where a request carries both a user's identity and an application key, the user's authorisation profile always prevails.
2.7 Granular permissions and fail-closed behaviour. Authorisation is based on atomic permissions resolved by the system, not on the subscription plan. Each interface explicitly declares the permission required and denies access in the absence of a declaration or of the permission. No profile other than the platform administrator may create or modify role definitions, and therefore cannot grant itself privileges higher than those it holds.
2.8 Access on behalf of a user. The feature by which the Provider's personnel operate on behalf of a User of the Customer is permitted only to expressly enabled profiles, cannot be activated by the mere declaration of the requester, requires higher privileges in order to operate on administrative profiles and is recorded in the audit log, together with the attempts denied. For Evo, access on behalf of a user is excluded: all the interfaces of Evo (conversations, files, personal and company memory, context and confirmation requests) refuse anyone who operates on behalf of another person, as well as application keys, as a rule of the system and not at the operator's discretion. Paragraph 14.3 remains unaffected.
2.9 Authorisations towards the connected services. The OAuth authorisations towards the services connected by the Customer are obtained with the authorisation code flow with Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE) and with a state parameter that is signed and verified with a constant-time comparison. The renewal of the tokens takes place in a single flow with a distributed lock.
2.10 Short-lived tokens. The sessions of the real-time transcription features and the test sessions of the voice agents use tokens of limited duration, single-use for the test sessions, with a verified signature. In the absence of the signing key no token is considered valid.
2.11 Custody of the tokens on the client side. The Customer's portal keeps the access token exclusively in memory, without writing it to the browser's local storage. The mobile application keeps the credentials in the secure storage of the operating system and applies a coordinated sign-out with deletion of the keys. The secondary portals do not expose any token to the browser, keeping the session on the server side in encrypted form.
2.12 Guest access to Whiteboards. The access of a person who has no account is limited to a single Whiteboard and is based on a random, high-entropy secret, kept only as a cryptographic fingerprint and shown only once to whoever creates it; in the address of the link the secret sits in a part that the browser does not send to servers and that therefore does not appear in access logs. Every link and invitation has an expiry date, which cannot exceed 90 days, and can be revoked by the owner with one click, with effect within seconds even on Guests already connected. To edit, the Guest receives an invitation by email and confirms their identity with a one-time code sent to the same address, short-lived, with a limited number of attempts and sends; whoever has the link but not the mailbox cannot enter. The Guest's session is short-lived, does not exceed the expiry of the access, is kept in memory by the portal and not in the browser's local storage. Before entering, the Guest reads and accepts the privacy notice; the version of the notice and the date of acceptance are recorded. The Guest cannot call people's functions and does not talk to Evo. Sharing outside the Space is off by default and is switched on by the Space administrator, who can switch it off at any time: with the switch off, links and invitations cease to be valid immediately and connected Guests leave.
3. Separation of data between Customers
3.1 Perimeter. The unit of separation is the application environment of the individual Customer. Every resource, request, credential and log is referred to that environment, and the user's membership of the environment is verified on every request.
3.2 Nature of the measure. The separation is achieved by means of explicit application controls in the services, supplemented by a single access verification rule applied as defence in depth. The Provider transparently declares that these are application controls safeguarded by automated regression tests and not a structural separation at the level of the data store.
3.3 Automated tests. Continuous integration runs, at every change, tests that verify: that each interface declares the permission required, with an explicit and reasoned list of the only exceptions allowed; that it is not possible to access resources belonging to other Customers; that the limitations on the privileges of the application keys are respected. Failure of those tests prevents the change from being integrated.
3.4 Soft deletion. The main entities of the data model are subject to soft deletion with a global filter, so that a deleted record is never returned by ordinary queries.
3.5 Separation of the Digital employees. Each Digital employee of the Customer runs in a dedicated container, with its own storage volumes, with the knowledge base mounted read-only and with a separate workspace. The local archive with conversations, memory and transcripts resides in the volume of the individual container.
3.6 Internal channel of the Digital employees. The calls from the container towards the central services are authenticated with a derived credential, verified with a constant-time comparison and bound to the identity of the Digital employee, with a consistency check against the orchestration system and with protection against the exchange of identity between different Digital employees.
3.7 Separation in observability. Every query on technical logs and traces must contain the reference to the Customer's environment, failing which it is rejected, and the user's membership of that environment is verified. For non-administrative profiles the technical fields that might contain fragments of content are removed from the results.
3.8 Resellers. The privileges granted to a reseller operate only on the resources linked to the reseller by an explicit relationship recorded in the system. The status of reseller can be modified only by the platform administrator and the modification is recorded in the audit log.
3.9 Separation of Evo's content and environments. Where Evo, the work assistant in the home of the portal, is active, the conversations, files and personal memory of a person can be read only by that person: no role has a function to read those of another person, including the administrator of the Customer's application environment (hereinafter the "space"), who can only switch the personal memory off or on for the whole space, manage the company memories and the access to resources, and remove from a role the permission to use Evo. The Provider's personnel operating on behalf of a user do not access any content of Evo (paragraph 2.8). Each person has their own execution environment for each space (paragraph 9.9) and every interface of Evo derives the environment from the pair formed by space and person: no interface reaches the environment of another person. The entries of the company memories can be read by whoever has access to the memory; the name of the author is visible only to the managers of the memory. Evo's audit log contains only identifiers and counts, never the text of conversations, files or memory entries, nor titles of conversations or file names; the administrators of the space see in the activity log who has deleted a conversation or a file of Evo and when.
3.10 Guests and projection. The Guest and the page that the automatic participant shows on screen have an authorisation criterion separate from that of people: they do not reach other Whiteboards, libraries, Evo conversations or the space's files. In Whiteboards, Evolus files appear as closed cards ("Restricted file", only the type) for Guests and for the projection, and the file reference is never sent to their browsers. Comments marked "Space people only" are not sent to Guests.
4. Encryption
4.1 Encryption of data in transit
- a) All communications between the clients and the platform take place over a channel encrypted with the TLS protocol, with mandatory redirection of unencrypted traffic outside the development environments.
- b) The metadata of the identity system are retrieved exclusively over an encrypted channel.
- c) The temporary links by which the files are made available are issued read-only, exclusively over an encrypted channel, with an expiry of no more than one hour.
- d) The connections to the incoming and outgoing mail servers configured by the Customer take place over an encrypted channel, with a protected negotiation.
- e) The mail accessed by the mobile application is transmitted exclusively over an encrypted channel with verification of the server's certificate, with no exception: an invalid certificate results in the connection being refused.
- f) The cross-origin access policy does not allow the transmission of session credentials, so that no cookie can be sent from a third-party origin.
4.2 Application-level encryption of data at rest
- a) The Provider applies application-level encryption with the AES 256-bit algorithm in GCM mode, with a versioned envelope, a random initialisation vector and an authentication tag. A key of non-compliant length is refused for use and a failed decryption generates an error without the data ever being returned.
- b) The following are protected with that encryption: the credentials and access keys of the services configured by the Customer, the credentials of the mailboxes and of the workflows, the signing secrets of the channels and of the webhooks, the credentials and tokens of the connectors activated by the Customer, the connection strings to the Customer's document archives, as well as the transcripts, the lists of participants and the results of the meetings processed by the mobile application.
- c) Transparency clarification. The application-level encryption referred to in point b) does not extend to the content of the chat conversations or to the documents uploaded to the knowledge libraries, which are protected by the access controls described in sections 2 and 3 and by the encryption at rest of the underlying storage referred to in paragraph 4.3. The same applies to the content of Evo, that is, to the conversations, histories, files and memory.
4.3 Encryption at rest of the infrastructure
The encryption at rest of the storage media is provided by the infrastructure providers according to their terms of service. The Provider does not declare that measure as verified by itself and does not assume it as its own contractual commitment until it obtains the written attestation of the cloud infrastructure provider and of the dedicated server provider.
4.4 Backups
The backups of the Digital employees are encrypted at source, before transmission to the remote archive: without the encryption key the copies cannot be used.
5. Management of secrets
5.1 Centralised store. The credentials and secrets necessary for the provision of the Service are kept in a dedicated store, organised by separate scopes, with the value encrypted at the time of writing in accordance with paragraph 4.2.
5.2 Master key. The master encryption key is unique, does not reside in the source code or in the versioned configuration files and is kept in the key store of the cloud infrastructure provider, from which it is made available to the application as a protected setting.
5.3 Resolution at the time of use. Secrets are resolved only at the moment when they are needed and with fail-closed behaviour: a reference that does not resolve generates an error and never produces an empty value. The configurations transmitted to the Digital employees contain exclusively references to the secrets, never the values.
5.4 Non-retrievability. The values of the secrets are never returned by the programming interfaces of the platform: the exclusion is imposed by construction by the response serialiser and does not depend on the individual developer. The store of secrets available to the Customer is write-only: the values entered can no longer be read back.
5.5 Logs. The values of the secrets are masked in the technical logs, including when resolved at the time of use, and do not appear in the start-up logs of the Digital employees.
6. Logging and monitoring
6.1 Audit log of administrative operations. The Provider maintains a log of administrative operations that records for each operation: date and time, actual author, any person who acted on behalf of a user, environment and organisation concerned, category and type of action, object concerned, details and source address. The operations covered include, among others, those on roles and permissions, users and memberships, credits and quotas, domains and groups, grants on resources and support tickets, as well as access on behalf of a user. For Whiteboards, the log records, for each fact, who, what and when, and never records contents, names of restricted files or full email addresses (for invitations, only the domain); for Guests' entries it records the chosen name, the access and the originating address. The log also records people's accesses to the platform, successful and unsuccessful, received from the identity system. The server's technical access logs, which contain the IP address and the address of the request, and the application logs are kept for 90 days; the traces of the requests, for 30 days; the logs of the telephony system, in which telephone numbers appear with the last digits masked, for 30 days; the system logs of the server that hosts the Digital employees, for at most 30 days.
6.2 Access to the log. Consultation of the log is protected by a dedicated permission. The view relating to an individual Customer is always filtered on that Customer's environment.
6.3 Retention. The entries of the audit log that concern accesses are retained for 12 months; the other entries, including administrative operations and consultations by the Provider's personnel, for 24 months; they are then automatically deleted. The entries of a deleted person remain: the Customer sees them attributed to a deleted person, while the name, the email address and the IP address remain consultable by the Provider's personnel alone for 12 months from the deletion and are then removed, leaving only an internal identifier. The identity system deletes its own access events after 90 days and keeps the administration events, without details, for 400 days.
6.4 Transparency clarification. The audit log covers administrative and configuration operations. The Provider does not declare an immutable log or a log of access to Customers' content.
6.5 Observability. The platform produces traces, metrics and technical logs with an observability system, enriched with the reference to the Customer's environment. Access is subject to the controls in paragraph 3.7. Metrics are retained for 12 months, traces for 30 days and technical logs for 90 days, save for the shorter periods in paragraph 6.1.
6.6 Content excluded from the logs. The coding rules prohibit the logging of secrets, tokens and extended user content, and are safeguarded by the review of the changes.
6.7 Operational alerts. The Provider maintains automatic alerts on the events relevant to continuity and security, including the negative outcome of the periodic restore checks and the repeated restart of the services, with notification to a monitored mailbox.
6.8 Public status page. The Provider publishes a status page for the Service, fed by internal probes and by probes towards the upstream providers, with notifications by email, a subscription channel and internal notices. As a security choice the page does not expose the name or the number of the Customers' Digital employees.
6.9 Infrastructure access logs. The Provider records the accesses to the platform's databases, successful and unsuccessful, and the changes to permissions, roles and structure; the accesses to the service that keeps the secrets; the accesses and operations on the software image registry; the requests received by the service that hosts the platform's interfaces, with the originating IP address and the requested address. The logs are kept in a dedicated archive, accessible only to authorised personnel: 365 days for the databases, for the secrets service and for the image registry, 90 days for the requests. They show who had access to a system and when, not which Customer content was read (paragraph 6.4).
7. Backups and continuity
7.1 Environment of the Digital employees
| Object | Frequency | Retention | Location |
|---|---|---|---|
| Local archive of each Digital employee | Hourly | 6 recent copies | Local storage of the production server |
| Workspaces and knowledge bases | Hourly | 24 hourly, 7 daily, 4 weekly, 1 monthly | Object storage in the European Union, separate from the production server, encrypted at source |
| Orchestration and management databases | Daily | Up to 14 local and 14 remote copies | Object storage in the European Union |
| Machine image | Daily | 7 snapshots | Service of the infrastructure provider |
7.1.1 Versions. The object storage that hosts the copies keeps the non-current versions for 30 days, as protection against accidental deletions.
7.1.2 Automatic check. An automatic check carried out every 6 hours performs a real restore of a Digital employee on a rotating basis from the remote archive and compares the cryptographic hashes of the restored data. A negative outcome generates an alert; at regular intervals a confirmation that the check itself is working is generated in any event.
7.1.3 Restore test. The most recent real restore test, carried out with a simulated loss of the volumes, was passed on 10 July 2026, with a measured restore time of approximately 15 minutes, the identity of the restored data verified by cryptographic hash and the service reactivated at the first attempt.
7.1.4 Perimeter. The following fall outside the perimeter of the backups, as a documented choice: the meeting recordings captured by means of the automatic participant, the application code and the caches of the workspaces.
7.2 Environment of the cloud platform
The backups of the database and of the file storage of the cloud platform are those provided for by the managed services of the infrastructure provider. The Provider does not declare, as at the date of this Annex, recovery time and maximum data loss objectives for that environment: the objectives will be declared and assumed as a commitment when the related configuration has been verified and documented. The files deleted from the file storage of the platform remain recoverable by the Provider alone, as protection against accidental deletions, and are permanently removed no later than 30 days after deletion.
8. Retention and deletion of the data
8.1 Automatic deletions. The Provider carries out the following automatic deletions or anonymisations:
| Category of data | Period | Effect |
|---|---|---|
| Temporary files produced by assisted processing | 24 hours | Deletion of the files |
| Temporary workspaces of the agents | 24 hours from the last write | Deletion |
| Results and audio of the meetings processed by the mobile application | 7 days, reduced to 6 hours from the first consultation | Deletion of the record and of the audio |
| Periodic summaries processed by the mobile application | 7 days, reduced to 6 hours from the first consultation | Deletion; clearing of the personal data in the processing operations not consulted |
| Details of the consumption of the Service | 13 months | Anonymisation: removal of the identifier and of the name of the end user and of the reference to the conversation |
| Audit log: entries of accesses to the platform | 12 months | Deletion |
| Audit log: administrative operations and other entries | 24 months | Deletion |
| Name, email address and IP address of a deleted person in the entries of the audit log | 12 months from the deletion | Removal; an internal identifier remains |
| Notifications in the portal | 90 days | Deletion |
| Personal authorisations to the connectors not used | 90 days of inactivity | Expiry of the authorisation |
| Meeting recordings captured by means of the automatic participant | 30 days | Deletion at the service |
| Technical execution traces of the Digital employees | 7 days, with a maximum cap of 30 | Deletion, save for the activities still open |
| Technical activity logs of the Digital employees (not the work content nor the memory) | 90 days | Automatic deletion |
| Security log of the Digital employees | 12 months | Automatic deletion |
| Resume state of the conversations of the Digital employees | 90 days from the last use | Deletion |
| Documents deleted from the knowledge libraries and held in the trash, where the trash is active | 30 days from deletion | Permanent deletion of the file, of its versions and of the related search indexes |
| Files of the knowledge libraries (shared libraries and agents' libraries) | Period chosen by the Customer in the "Data retention" page, "Library files" type: from 1 day to 10 years or "Never"; in the absence of a choice, "Never". A library may have a shorter period; the shorter of the library's period and the space's period applies. Counted from the last use of the file (paragraph 8.11) | Moving to the library's trash in the days following expiry |
| Expired library files, in the library's trash | 30 days from the move, even where the trash is not active (in which case the trash is not visible and the file cannot be restored) | Permanent deletion of the file, of its versions and of the related search indexes |
| Conversations with Evo (including those of the agents that Evo has asked) and their histories, where Evo is active | Period chosen by the Customer in the "Data retention" page, "Conversations and channels" type (from 1 to 730 days, 730 by default), counted from the last message | Deletion, including from Evo's execution environment |
| Evo's "My files" files (files uploaded in conversations with Evo and files that Evo prepares), where Evo is active | Period chosen by the Customer in the "Data retention" page, "Personal files" type: from 1 to 730 days; in the absence of a choice, 730. Counted from the last use of the file (paragraph 8.11) | Permanent deletion, without trash, with all versions and also from Evo's execution environment |
| Entries of Evo's memory, personal and company | Period of the "Conversations and channels" type, counted from the last update or the last use of the entry | Deletion of the entry with its search index, revisions and links |
| Archived, expired or superseded Evo memory entries and revisions of their texts | 30 days from archiving, expiry, replacement or revision | Deletion |
| Texts awaiting Evo's memory extractor | Until processing ends and in any case at most 24 hours | Deletion |
| Evo confirmation requests | Expire after 24 hours if unanswered; their arguments are deleted after 30 days or with the conversation | Expiry and clearing of the arguments; deletion with the conversation |
| Unused Evo execution environment | 30 days without use | Deletion of the environment and of what it contains; the history of the conversations remains in the platform for the period of the conversations with Evo |
| Jobs of the content created by Evo (type, outcome, quantity, cost; without the text of the request), where Evo is active | Deleted when concluded before the period chosen by the Customer for Evo's conversations; when the conversation is deleted they lose the title and the links | Deletion; emptying when the conversation is deleted |
| Register of the fingerprints of the content generated by Evo (fingerprint, type, type of provider, outcome, technical identifiers of space and conversation, date; no person, no content) | 730 days from the creation of the content, even after the deletion of the conversation, of the account or of the space | Automatic daily deletion |
| Audio of the sentences of "Talk" | Not kept: transcribed and discarded | No retention |
| Live transcript lines of meetings with a Whiteboard (speaker, text, minute) | 7 days, or with the meeting if deleted earlier | Deletion |
| Guest sessions, confirmation codes and invitations, including the invitation's email address | 30 days after the expiry of the access | Deletion |
| Email addresses of those who ask to edit a Whiteboard | 30 days after the request is handled, or after the link expires if not handled | Deletion of the address |
| Deletion markers of elements removed from Whiteboards | 30 days | Removal at the next snapshot |
| Server technical access logs (with the IP address) and application logs | 90 days | Automatic deletion |
| Traces of the requests | 30 days | Automatic deletion |
| Operating metrics | 12 months | Automatic deletion |
| Telephony system logs (telephone numbers with the last digits masked, IP address) | 30 days | Automatic deletion |
| System logs of the server that hosts the Digital employees | At most 30 days | Automatic deletion |
| Infrastructure access logs (paragraph 6.9) | 365 days; 90 days for the requests to the service that hosts the interfaces | Automatic deletion |
| Access events of the identity system | 90 days; administration events, without details, 400 days | Automatic deletion |
| Errors of the calls to artificial intelligence models | 30 days | Automatic deletion |
| Content awaiting or undergoing deferred processing | Up to 14 days; 24 hours if the processing succeeds | Deletion |
| Attachments uploaded for a conversation and never sent | 7 days from upload | Deletion |
| List of the recipients of the messages that the Provider sends from the platform (address, language, channel, outcome, date) | 12 months from sending | Deletion; the text of the message and the counts remain |
8.2 Voice conversations. The retention of the voice conversations is configurable by the Customer for each agent. A nightly process applies a double criterion, considering both the expiry communicated by the voice provider for the individual conversation and the period configured by the Customer, and applies whichever of the two expires first. The deletion entails the effective removal of the audio file from the archive and the clearing of the transcript, of the summary, of the analysis, of the caller's telephone number and of the reference to the audio, with a further attempt in the event of an error. A residual technical row remains, without personal data, kept for the sole purpose of avoiding duplication at the import stage and of demonstrating that the declaration of artificial nature was made.
8.3 Mode without retention. The Customer may activate a mode in which the voice conversation is recorded without content from the moment of acquisition.
8.4 Deletion at the Customer's initiative. Where the trash of the knowledge libraries is active, a document deleted by the Customer by hand, from the portal, through the APIs or through an artificial intelligence assistant of the platform is moved to the library's trash for 30 days: it is no longer visible or used by the Service and by artificial intelligence, and its search indexes are removed at the time of deletion, while the file remains in the archive. Within the 30 days, the Users authorised to edit the library may restore the document or delete it at once, including by emptying the trash. Through the APIs, permanent deletion can also be requested without going through the trash. At the end of the 30 days, or earlier if the document is deleted from the trash, the deletion entails the removal of the file and of its versions from the archive, the removal of the related search indexes and the soft deletion of the record. Where the trash is not active, the deletion of a document entails the same removals, immediately. The deletion of a library entails the immediate and permanent deletion of the documents it contains, including those held in the trash. Automatic deletions do not go through the trash and are final, except for the moving of expired library files for the period chosen by the Customer, described in paragraph 8.11. The deletion of a User entails soft deletion in the platform and effective deletion on the identity system, with a record in the audit log.
8.5 Transparency clarification. The chat conversations are retained for the period chosen by the Customer in the "Data retention" page of the portal, from 1 to 730 days from the last message; in the absence of a choice 730 days apply; in any case they are deleted at the end of the Contract in accordance with Article 10 of Annex A. The documents in the knowledge libraries are retained for the period chosen by the Customer for the "Library files" type (paragraph 8.11); with "Never", which is the default choice, no automatic deletion period is provided and they are retained for the duration of the Contract. In any case they can be deleted at the Customer's initiative in accordance with paragraph 8.4 and are deleted at the end of the Contract in accordance with Article 10 of Annex A. The conversations and memory of Evo follow the period chosen by the Customer in the same page for the "Conversations and channels" type; the "My files" files follow that of the "Personal files" type, counted from the last use; in accordance with table 8.1 and paragraphs 8.7 and 8.11.
8.6 Deletion at the end of the Contract. Article 10 of Annex A applies in full, governing the choice between return and deletion, the periods of 60 and 90 days and the blocking of access in the intervening period.
8.7 Deletions concerning Evo. Where Evo is active:
- a) the deletion of a conversation with Evo by the person entails the immediate deletion of the conversation and of its history, of the confirmation requests with their arguments and of the conversations of the agents that Evo has asked, including from Evo's execution environment (except for a temporary unavailability of the service that governs the environments, in which case the deletion from the environment is completed as soon as the service is available again); if Evo is working on that conversation, the work is interrupted and the files that Evo has not yet saved in "My files" are lost; the files already in "My files" remain until the person deletes them; the memory entries that Evo has drawn from the conversation are not deleted with it and are managed as provided in letter c);
- b) the deletion of a file in "My files" is immediate and final, including from the execution environment, and covers all the versions of the file, its preview and the copies that the person has sent to other conversations; the text of the file that Evo has read remains in the history of the conversation in which it read it, until that conversation is deleted; a link to a deleted file, quoted in a conversation, no longer opens;
- c) the person can delete a single memory entry, a single node (with or without the linked entries) or the entire personal memory, even when the memory is switched off; archiving an entry does not delete it: Evo no longer uses it and the entry is deleted after 30 days;
- d) the person who leaves the space, deletes their account or has their account deleted by the Provider's personnel loses the personal memory, the files (except those saved in a library), the conversations (including those of the agents that Evo has asked), the histories and Evo's execution environment; the entries of the company memories that the person had confirmed remain with the organisation, without the name of the author;
- e) on the deletion of the space, the data of Evo (conversations, histories, files, execution environments, personal and company memory) are deleted at once; only the register of the fingerprints of the content generated by Evo with artificial intelligence remains, which contains neither people nor content, shows only technical identifiers of the space and of the conversation, and is retained for 730 days; at the end of the Contract Article 10 of Annex A applies, which includes the data of Evo;
- f) the person who loses the permission to use Evo but remains in the space does not lose their data, which remain and follow the retention period chosen by the Customer; their execution environment is deleted after 30 days without use;
- g) a content that Evo is preparing when the person deletes the conversation is completed: the file arrives in "My files" without the conversation of origin and the credits consumed are charged; if instead the person leaves the space, deletes their account, has their account deleted by the Provider's personnel or the space is deleted while the content is being prepared, the content is completed at the model provider, the credits consumed are charged and the file is discarded and not delivered; the person's data are deleted without waiting for the content to be completed, except for the technical job of the content being prepared, which is deleted after its completion.
For the deletions under letters d) and e), if the service that governs the execution environments is temporarily unavailable, the deletion from the environments is completed as soon as the service is available again. Deletion from the systems in use does not entail immediate deletion from the backup copies, which follow the periods of Article 10.4 of Annex A.
8.8 Generated content: recognisability and register. Where Evo is active, the images, narrated audio and videos created by Evo are content generated by artificial intelligence and the Provider makes them recognisable as required by Article 50 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, with the following measures.
- a) The file of the model provider is not modified: the Provider does not re-encode it, resize it or convert it. On delivery it inspects it to check whether it already carries a machine-readable marking (a C2PA manifest, or a declaration of origin from artificial intelligence in the metadata) and, if it does, leaves it intact; the inspection checks the presence of the marking, not the validity of its signature.
- b) If the file carries no marking and its format allows one to be added without altering the content, the Provider writes into the metadata a marking of its own: origin from artificial intelligence according to the IPTC classification, tool "Evolus Evo", declaration "AI" and date. The marking does not touch images and sounds and does not contain the text of the request, nor the person, the space or the model. It is a declaration in the metadata, not a cryptographic signature. If the structure of the file is not recognised, or the file already contains metadata of the provider that do not declare the artificial origin, the file remains as it is and this layer is missing; the outcome is recorded as "no marking".
- c) In the portal every content carries the "AI-generated" label, fixed and not hideable, in the conversation, in the player and in the preview, and in "My files" for videos and narrated audio; the "About this content" item of the menu of the content, in the conversation and, for videos and narrated audio, in "My files", says that the content was created by artificial intelligence, what type of marking it carries and what the fingerprint of the file is, without naming the model provider.
- d) For every content delivered the Provider records the SHA-256 fingerprint of the file delivered (after any marking added), the type of content, the type of provider, the outcome of the marking, whether the marking was added by the Provider, the technical identifiers of the space and of the conversation and the date. The register contains no persons, texts or files; it is retained for 730 days from the creation of the content, even after the deletion of the conversation, of the account or of the space, and is then deleted automatically every day; it can be consulted only by the Provider's authorised personnel, to answer, starting from a file, the question "was this file generated by Evo?".
Transparency clarifications. Markings in the metadata are lost when the file is converted, edited, cropped, photographed from the screen or republished by some services. Model providers may also insert imperceptible signs in the content itself: the Provider has no public tool to read them and does not guarantee that they exist. The Provider does not sign the content with a certificate of its own. The audio of "Talk" is not marked: it is produced and played in real time, is not a file and is not kept, and the person is informed that they are speaking with an artificial intelligence aloud, at the start of the session, and in writing, throughout the session.
8.9 Whiteboards. Where the function is active: a) a Whiteboard is kept with everything it contains (saved versions, Evo's interventions, comments, votes, list of people, links and invitations) for the duration chosen by the Customer on the "Data retention" page for the type of file it is in ("Personal files" in "My files", "Library files" in a library), counted from the last use (paragraph 8.11), and until it is deleted; deletion of a Whiteboard by the person is immediate and permanent, with copies; b) the Whiteboard keeps the last 20 saved versions and the last 20 Evo interventions, which are replaced by number and not by days: an element deleted from the Whiteboard may therefore remain in a saved version or in an Evo intervention until these are replaced or the Whiteboard is deleted; c) a Guest's comment remains in the Whiteboard, with the name the Guest chose, as long as the Whiteboard exists; on request, the owner can anonymise a Guest's name, which becomes "Guest"; d) the export of a Whiteboard by a person is a file produced at the time of the request and is not kept by the Provider; e) the temporary copy in the browser is described in paragraph 8.10.
8.10 Editable documents and temporary copy in the browser. Where the function is active: a) an Editable document (text document, spreadsheet, presentation) is kept in "My files" or in a library with the last 20 saved versions, which are replaced by number and not by days; deletion is that of paragraphs 8.4 and 8.7; b) so as not to lose work if the connection drops or the tab is closed, the portal writes in the browser of whoever is working, in a local store (IndexedDB), a temporary copy of the content not yet saved of a text document, a spreadsheet or a Whiteboard: one copy per person, per Space and per document, written shortly after each edit and when the tab moves to the background; the copy is not sent to the server, is removed when the save succeeds or when the person discards it, and a copy older than 30 days is removed the next time the document is opened; it is not a save and does not create versions; c) for conversion, preview and rendering, the portal and the web API send the content to the Provider's conversion service, which works without network access, in an isolated environment with a read-only file system and a temporary area emptied at the end of the job, does not keep the content beyond the single processing and answers only to the platform with a key.
8.11 Library files and personal files: duration and last use.
- a) The Customer chooses on the "Data retention" page how long the files of the knowledge libraries ("Library files" type: from 1 day to 10 years, or "Never", which is the default choice) and Evo's "My files" files ("Personal files" type: from 1 to 730 days, 730 by default) are retained. Whoever can edit a library may give it a shorter period than that of the space; the shorter of the two applies, and the space's period is the maximum.
- b) The days are counted from the last use of the file. A use occurs whenever the file is found in a search or read by Evo or by an agent, opened, previewed, downloaded (including through the APIs), modified, saved as a new version, used in a conversation, copied to another library, transferred between "My files" and a library or restored from the trash. The presence of the file in a list, the search by name, the renaming and the moving from one library to another are not a use. For the files already present when the two types came into use, the days are counted from that moment.
- c) An expired library file is moved to the trash of its library in the days following expiry: from that moment it is no longer used by artificial intelligence, because its search indexes are removed, and it remains in the trash for 30 days, during which whoever can edit the library may restore it; a restored file counts as just used. Where the libraries' trash is not active, the expired file is nevertheless moved to the trash, which is not visible, and cannot be restored. After the 30 days the file is permanently deleted with its versions.
- d) An expired "My files" file is permanently deleted, without trash, with all its versions, its preview and the copy present in Evo's execution environment.
- e) A shorter period chosen for the space starts to apply after 7 days, during which the Customer may cancel it, unless there is nothing to delete; a shorter period chosen for a single library applies at once, after a confirmation that states how many files will go to the trash.
9. Secure development
9.1 Protected branches and review. The main branches of the code accept changes exclusively by means of a pull request subject to review. Direct writing is not permitted.
9.2 Automated checks. On every pull request continuous integration carries out the restore of the dependencies, the compilation in release configuration and the execution of the test suite, with minimum privileges assigned to the runner. A dedicated check prevents the integration of changes that lack the documentation of the impact for the user.
9.3 Release without static credentials. The release into production takes place by means of a federated identity towards the infrastructure provider, without static credentials stored in the continuous integration system. The new version is published in a test environment and promoted to production only after verification, with the possibility of an immediate return to the previous version.
9.4 Coding rules safeguarded by automated tools. The Provider uses its own static analysis tools that prohibit generic exception handling in the services, prohibit the silent suppression of errors and require the protection of risky calls. The manual construction of error responses is prevented at compilation time.
9.5 Security regression tests. The suite includes dedicated tests on: coverage of the permission check on every interface, impossibility of accessing resources of other Customers, list of the operations denied to the application keys, single display of the keys, limitation of the keys to individual Digital employees, encryption of the data at rest, retention and deletion of the voice conversations, verification of the webhook signatures, protection against requests towards internal network resources, use of the Proof Key for Code Exchange and of the signed state in the authorisations, isolation of the execution of the scripts and pseudonymisation features.
9.6 Isolated execution of the scripts. The scripts defined by the Customer in the automations are executed in an isolated environment, without access to external resources and limited by recursion depth, memory, time, number of instructions and duration of the search expressions.
9.7 Error contract. The error responses returned to the clients do not contain execution traces or internal details: they are returned in a standardised format with a correlation identifier useful for support.
9.8 Transparency clarification. The Provider does not declare, as at the date of this Annex, the automatic execution in continuous integration of dependency vulnerability analysis, of secret scanning or of third-party static security analysis of the code.
9.9 Isolated execution of Evo. Where Evo is active, the work of Evo for each person and for each space is carried out in a dedicated execution environment, that is, an isolated virtual machine of Microsoft's Azure Container Apps Sandboxes service in the West Europe region, with the following measures.
- a) The outbound network of the environment is closed by default and the traffic is inspected. Only three destinations of the platform can be reached: the Provider's AI gateway, limited to the conversation with the model and the list of the models (images, videos and voices are not generated from the environment but with tools of the platform: paragraph 10.7 h)); the interface of Evo's tools (memory, libraries, agents, connectors, APIs, Evolus tools and creation of images, narrated audio and videos); the interface of the organisation's connectors and MCP servers. No other address can be reached, including the internet, the database, the file archive, the secrets vault and the other environments. The rule is reapplied each time the environment is created and each time it is resumed.
- b) For each request towards the three destinations the network of the environment adds a personal key, which contains the space and the person, is signed, lasts 60 minutes and is renewed every 20. The code running in the environment never sees the key. A personal key does not open the other interfaces of the platform and at every request the platform rechecks the membership of the space, the activation of Evo and the permission to use it.
- c) The environment contains neither the secrets of the connectors nor the access keys to the Customer's services, which remain in the platform.
- d) The platform's access to Evo's engine in the environment is protected by a password that is different for each environment, derived from a secret held in the secrets vault.
- e) Evo's engine is software of the Provider: telemetry and automatic updates are disabled, its agents cannot read or modify the configuration and state folders of the engine, and the environment runs with an unprivileged user.
- f) The environment is suspended after 60 seconds without work and is deleted, with what it contains, after 30 days without use; the history of the conversations remains in the platform.
Transparency clarifications. The AI gateway does not know the activation of Evo or the permissions, which are checked by the platform: between a change of permissions and the expiry of the personal key, at most 60 minutes, the requests to the models with an already issued key may therefore continue, unless the key has been removed from the network, which takes about one second. The key is removed from the network at once when a person leaves the space or deletes their account, and within a few minutes when a person loses the permission to use Evo while remaining in the space; Evo's tools, on the other hand, are denied at once in both cases, because at every request the platform rechecks the membership of the space and the permission. Microsoft's service has been introduced recently and the Provider does not declare availability or recovery objectives for Evo's execution environments, which are not included in the backup copies of section 7.1: Evo's conversations and files are copied to the database and to the file archive of the platform, referred to in paragraph 7.2.
9.10 Voice conversation of Evo ("Talk"). Where Evo is active, the voice conversation does not pass through the execution environment and uses the same access controls as Evo (permission to use Evo, switch, plan feature, credits, refusal of access on behalf of a user).
- a) The detection of speech (start and end of each sentence) runs in the person's browser.
- b) For each sentence the portal obtains a single-use ticket, valid for 120 seconds, and opens with it a connection to a relay of the platform, which forwards the audio to an external voice transcription provider. A connection accepts at most 90 seconds of audio and closes after 20 seconds without audio. The audio is transcribed and discarded: it is not kept and not written to the technical logs; the text of the sentence remains, and becomes a message of the conversation.
- c) Evo's answer is synthesised sentence by sentence by an external speech synthesis provider, with the default voice of the platform; neither the text nor the audio are written to the technical logs and the audio is not kept.
- d) Each person can have only one session open; the session lasts at most, by default, 30 minutes and closes after, by default, 90 seconds of silence. The start, the duration, the number of sentences and the reason for closing are written to the audit log, never the audio or the text.
- e) At the start of each session Evo declares aloud that it is an artificial intelligence assistant and the screen shows it throughout the session.
Transparency clarification. The Provider does not control the retention of the audio and of the text at the transcription and synthesis providers, which is the one indicated on the sub-processors page.
10. Protection against abuse and improper use
10.1 Rate limiting of the requests. The application interfaces are protected by rate limits, with a standardised response and an indication of the waiting time. Separate policies are provided for the chat widget with an instantaneous limit and a daily budget per Customer, for the authenticated user and for anonymous traffic, as well as configurable rules for each individual path and for each individual Customer.
10.2 Processing limits. The jobs executed asynchronously are subject to a concurrency limit per Customer, which cannot be exceeded. The consumption of the Service is subject to a quota, with fail-closed behaviour when it is exceeded.
10.3 Validation of the origin of the widget. The chat widget accepts requests only from declared and verified origins. The absence of the origin results in refusal.
10.4 Integrity of the incoming communications. All the webhooks received from external providers are subject to verification of the signature, with a constant-time comparison. For the voice channel the verification includes refusal in the absence of the secret and protection against the replay of the same request based on the time reference.
10.5 Outgoing communications. The webhooks sent towards the Customer's systems are signed, so that the recipient can verify their authenticity.
10.6 Protection against requests towards internal resources. The addresses that the platform contacts at the Customer's request are subject to a check that refuses the request when even a single resolved address belongs to reserved, internal or service ranges of the infrastructure. The check is repeated at every new attempt to send.
10.7 Third-party texts and hidden instructions. Evo treats as data, never as instructions, the text of a web page, of a document, of an attachment, of a library, of the reply of an agent, of a connector or of an API: if the text contains a request, Evo ignores it and tells the person what it asked for. The system does not rely on Evo's instructions alone:
- a) every action that changes or sends something goes through a confirmation card, valid for 24 hours and with frozen arguments, which only the person can confirm;
- b) the memory extractor reads only the text written by the person, not that of third parties, and the texts are placed in a frame that cannot be closed from the inside;
- c) the fixed instructions of the memory (priorities 1 and 2) are reserved to the person and cannot be proposed with the card of the company memories;
- d) writing to memory has limits: 8 entries per job, 60 per day per memory, 3 fixed instructions per day;
- e) an internal helper of Evo cannot propose cards or write to memory;
- f) the APIs connected to Evo by the administrator are limited to 30 calls per minute per person when they do not go through a card;
- g) a library or an agent that the person cannot read cannot be reached by Evo, not even for an administrator;
- h) the content created (images, narrated audio, videos) does not start from the execution environment, which does not reach the generators: it is created by tools of the platform, which estimate the cost, check the credits before every expense and ask for the person's confirmation for videos, for more expensive content and for content that originates from a text that is not the person's.
Transparency clarification. No measure completely rules out the risk of hidden instructions: the system cannot know where Evo took a fact from, and a hidden text could lead it to save an incorrect entry in the person's personal memory; for the company memories the barrier is the confirmation card. The person sees, and can correct or delete, every entry. For the content created, the origin of the text ("the person's" or someone else's) is declared by Evo and the system cannot verify it: a hidden text could lead Evo to declare it the person's and to start, without confirmation, a content costing less than the confirmation threshold; the risk is limited by the threshold, by the check of the credits and by the fact that every content appears in the conversation.
10.8 Refusals of the memory. The single writer of the memory, which serves both Evo and the extractor, refuses in a deterministic way, with a coded reason and never reporting the refused text: a) secrets, that is, access keys with known prefixes, assignments of the type "password = value", addresses with credentials, valid IBANs and card numbers; b) the special categories of data under Article 9 of the Regulation and data relating to criminal convictions and offences under Article 10, recognised by obvious words in Italian, English, Spanish, French and German; c) evaluations of the people who work, for example judgements on performance. The check is deliberately coarse and does not guarantee that every case is recognised; Evo's instructions complete it. In their own personal memory, written by hand, the person may also enter sensitive data and evaluations, which remain visible only to them; in the company memories and when Evo writes this is not possible.
10.9 Anonymous access and voice commands. The functions that do not require an account (Guest entry, code confirmation, request to edit) are protected by rate limits distinct by address, by link and by invitation, with an identical response for non-existent links and addresses, so that it is not possible to check whether an address or a link exists. Voice commands in meetings have rate limits and a ceiling on real-time listening time, and act only on the Whiteboard.
11. Protective tools available to the Customer
11.1 Region of residence of the voice data. The selection of the European region of the voice provider, with effect on the calls and transcripts of one's own environment, is available to Customers on the Enterprise Plan; for the other plans the global region applies. For the shared voice subscriptions made available by the Provider the global region applies in any event. The features reserved to the Enterprise Plan are available where provided for in the commercial proposal accepted by the Provider, pursuant to Article 2.3 of the Conditions; the plans are described in the price list published at https://evolus.ai/en/pricing.
11.2 Routing of the requests to the models and limitation of the providers. The following are available to Customers on the Enterprise Plan, where provided for in the commercial proposal accepted by the Provider pursuant to Article 2.3 of the Conditions: the definition of the list of inference providers permitted for one's own environment, which is applied by the system and prevails over the preferences set at the level of the individual feature; the European routing of the requests to the models, by means of the European Union endpoint of the routing service; the routing solely to zero-retention endpoints. For the other plans, global routing and the inference providers on the list published on the sub-processors page, at https://evolus.ai/en/subprocessors, apply.
11.3 Retention of the voice conversations. For all plans the Customer may configure the retention period for each voice agent and may activate the mode without retention, in accordance with paragraphs 8.2 and 8.3.
11.4 Pseudonymisation and masking. The platform makes available features for the pseudonymisation of personal data and for the masking of documents. The masking of documents in PDF format is achieved by means of rasterisation, so that the masked text is no longer present in the file produced. A pseudonymisation block can be used within the automations defined by the Customer.
11.5 Protections that cannot be disabled. The Digital employees apply protections that cannot be disabled by the Customer or circumvented by means of instructions, concerning the explicit confirmation of the user before significant actions, verification of the identity of the recipient, verification of the authenticity of the sender and the declaration of artificial nature. The voice channel also applies a set of rules that cannot be disabled, protecting the personal data of employees, internal communications, economic data and opinions.
11.6 Declaration of artificial nature. The declaration of artificial nature is reapplied by the system to the outgoing communications, cannot be removed by the Customer and proof of it is retained. The Provider carries out a periodic compliance check on the communications generated.
11.7 Mobile application. The audio of the voice messages is not kept on the Provider's systems beyond the processing, only the measurement of the duration for consumption purposes remaining. The audio of the meetings recorded on the device is placed in an area excluded from the system backups. Access to the camera is excluded from the permissions of the application. The permission requests expressly declare to the user that the content passes through the Provider's systems and the artificial intelligence provider.
11.8 Whiteboard sharing. The space administrator has a switch, off by default, that allows or forbids sharing Whiteboards with Guests for the whole space; each owner can create, see and revoke the links and invitations of their own Whiteboards; the Customer can keep Evo out of meetings by not sending it.
12. Providers and sub-processors
12.1 Selection. The Provider selects the sub-processors on the basis of the guarantees offered as regards data protection and information security, and enters into a data processing agreement with each of them with obligations no less onerous than those assumed towards the Customer.
12.2 Public list. The list of the sub-processors is published in versioned form at https://evolus.ai/en/subprocessors, indicating the activity performed, the country of establishment and the legal basis of the transfer, where applicable.
12.3 Changes. Additions and replacements are communicated to the Customer at the latest on the date on which the new sub-processor starts the processing, with a right to object on reasoned grounds within 30 days of the communication, in accordance with Article 5 of Annex A.
12.4 Transfers. The legal bases of the transfers to third countries and the features that reduce transfers reserved to the Enterprise Plan are governed by Article 6 of Annex A.
13. Management of incidents and personal data breaches
13.1 Documented procedure. The Provider maintains a documented procedure for the management of personal data breaches, which defines the detection and reporting channels, the roles and responsibilities, the operational stages with the related time limits, the criteria for assessing the risk to data subjects, the communication templates and the rules on closure, root cause analysis and verification of the corrective actions.
13.2 Internal reporting. Every person working for the Provider is required to report without delay, and in any event within one hour, any suspicious event, through the dedicated channels and without carrying out preliminary analyses, with a prohibition on altering or destroying the evidence.
13.3 Containment and preservation of the evidence. The procedure provides for standard containment measures, including the revocation of the sessions and authorisations, the blocking of accounts, the isolation of the container concerned, the suspension of the individual feature, the rotation of the secrets, the revocation of the temporary links to the files and the blocking of outgoing communications, as well as the freezing and extraction of the evidence with an integrity check.
13.4 Notification to the Customer. The Provider notifies the Customer of every breach concerning its data within 48 hours of becoming aware of it, regardless of the level of risk, with the content provided for by Article 33, paragraph 3, of the Regulation, and transmits periodic updates until the closure of the case, in accordance with Article 9 of Annex A.
13.5 Breach register. The Provider keeps a register of personal data breaches documenting the circumstances, the effects, the measures adopted, the decisions on the notifications and the related reasons, including the near misses intercepted before they produced effects.
13.6 Review and testing. The procedure is reviewed at least annually and after every breach classified as medium or high risk, and is subjected to a simulation exercise on an annual basis.
14. Personnel
14.1 Confidentiality. The persons authorised to process Customers' data have signed confidentiality agreements, the obligation under which continues after the end of the relationship.
14.2 Authorisation and instructions. Authorisation to process is granted only to the persons who need it for the provision of the Service, for assistance, for maintenance and for security, with written instructions on the manner of the processing.
14.3 Access to Customers' data. Access by personnel to Customers' data takes place by means of the platform's tools, is subject to the controls in section 2 and is logged in accordance with paragraph 2.8 and section 6. For Evo, access on behalf of a user is excluded (paragraph 2.8) and the personnel do not access a user's Evo content by means of the platform's tools. The authorisations for access to the infrastructure that hosts the data remain unchanged, and are the same as those provided for any other data of the platform (paragraph 14.2).
14.4 Training. A programme for training personnel on the protection of personal data and on information security is being adopted within the management system referred to in paragraph 1.3. The Provider does not declare, as at the date of this Annex, that training has already been delivered.
15. Revision of this Annex
15.1 Update. The Provider may update this Annex to reflect the technical and organisational evolution of the measures, provided that the overall level of security is not reduced, pursuant to Article 12.5 of the Conditions.
15.2 Versioning. Each version is identified by a code and by an SHA-256 hash of the text. Previous versions remain accessible to the Customer for the entire duration of the Contract.
15.3 Communication. Updates are communicated in the manner and with the notice periods set out in Article 13 of the Conditions. Updates that entail a reduction of the guarantees give the right to withdraw without penalties in accordance with Article 13.2 of the Conditions.
15.4 Periodic review. The Provider reviews the measures at the intervals set out in paragraph 1.4 and updates this Annex in the event of a substantial change.
Annex B, version 1.4. CodeDesign S.r.l., Via Nino Pesce 38, 18018 Taggia (IM), VAT No. IT01739830089. Data protection contact: privacy@codedesign.it.